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TEST AND EVALUATION ASPECTS OF THE NIMBUS II 
PROGRAM USEFUL TO OTHER LONG LIFE SPACE PROGRAMS*
S. Charp 
Consulting Scientist
. General Electric Company
Missile and Space Division 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
The Nimbus II satellite has been in orbit 20 
months (to January 15, 1968), operating well with­ 
in design specifications as a carrier spacecraft 
for meteorological instruments.
This spacecraft includes a three axis active 
attitude control system which itself is more com­ 
plex than many other satellites and their included 
payloads. An essential element of the total 
development of Nimbus is the intensive and exten­ 
sive test and evaluation programs at the General 
Electric Company, to which the prototype/qualifi­ 
cation and flight spacecraft were exposed, coupled 
with selected design features which contribute to 
long life. Although a rigid causal relation can­ 
not be established between the programs' adminis­ 
trative and technical activities associated with 
the design of the spacecraft, integration of pay- 
loads and the test and evaluation program, and 
the long-life on-orbit performance experienced, 
they are considered important contributing factors. 
This paper reviews: the essential elements of the 
General Electric Company's program, long-life 
aspects of the spacecraft f s basic design, the 
fundamental philosophies which guide the test and 
evaluation program, the multiple nature of the 
test and evaluation program, review and analysis 
of failures encountered in the systems test pro­ 
grams from fabrication to alunch and of anomalies 
encountered in the orbital performance, and some 
representative lessons learned from the program 
which can be applied directly to other long life 
space programs.
I. Introduction
The Nimbus II spacecraft was launched into a 
near polar orbit in the early morning of May 15, 
1966, and has been performing its planned func­ 
tions well within its design specifications for 
over 1.6 years at the time of this writing. The 
Nimbus I spacecraft was launched into a similar 
orbit in the early morning of August 28, 1964, 
and lasted for 26 days, at which time the solar 
array drive ceased rotating and power was 
depleted. Both spacecraft were unqualified 
successes in 'terms of their useful operating life 
and in terms of the vast amounts of meteorological 
data acquired by the payload f s sensors and 
collected by the data center. These spacecraft 
were launched without benefit of prior engineering 
flight tests to assess potential orbital weak­ 
nesses. To what degree is it meaningful to relate
'cThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration*
Goddard Space Flight Center, Nimbus Project Office,.
Greenbelt, Maryland, has Systems Management respon­ 
sibility for the series of Nimbus spacecraft* Under 
contract to this group, the General Electric 
Company, Spacecraft- Department, designed and devel­ 
oped the three axis, active stabilization and atti­ 
tude control system; designed, developed! and 
fabricated the spacecraft structure, thermal con­ 
trol system, and various components; integrated 
experiments and meteorological sensors; and tested 
the complete spacecraft.
the spacecraft's development history to the 
on-orbit performance?
The planned life of Nimbus was six months at 
the time of the start of the program, long by any 
then-existing demonstrated performance. The pay- 
loads were new and at the edge of the state-of-art . 
Man's knowledge of the space environment was quite 
meager. As a space carrier for experimental-type 
meteorological instruments, the life required of 
the spacecraft should be at least that of the most 
significant instruments being evaluated. Con­ 
versely, to be most effective, a spacecraft capable 
of a six-month life should carry instruments like­ 
wise designed to live for six calendar months. 
Thus the life requirements and demonstrated per­ 
formance for the spacecraft and its housekeeping 
electronics equipment can be treated separately 
from that of the "passengers".
What constitutes the orbital success of Nimbus 
II? In-orbit success must be measured only in 
terms of the performance of the bus. Did the bus 
function in orbit in a way to allow the payload 
instruments to perform their intended functions 
over a time period of at least six months? From 
the point of view of the research and development 
mission, the entire Nimbus II orbital program was 
an unqualified success. To a somewhat lesser 
degree Nimbus I was almost as successful in spite 
of its near-one-month life, because in its time 
environment the total data taking mission was more 
successful than had actually been anticipated, 
prior to flight, by those individuals close to the 
program.
To what factors can the a posteriori success 
of a single long life spacecraft be attributed? 
Causal relations are hardly likely to be devel­ 
oped between the flight performance of a single 
spacecraft and planning methods, procedures, tests 
and evaluations. A more meaningful answer to this 
question can be had by outlining the activities at 
the General Electric Company which preceded the 
successful flight; and relating these to a. review 
and analysis of the failures which occurred during 
flight. If similar analyses were made with 
respect to other programs of like complexity, 
which, resulted in long .life (greater than one 
year) orbital performance, and the respective data 
were examined for commonalities, then perhaps 
collectively causal relations could be derived.
Constrained by data accumulated from only a 
single example of a long life complex spacecraft, 
it is clear a causal relationship which defines a - 
differential sensitivity between 'What and low 
things were done and in-orbit performance cannot 
be. established on the basis of scientific, techni­ 
cal, and logical considerations,, Neither is it: 
meaningful to dogmatically state and assign, 
requirements for activities which.,, if conducted, 
would insure successful orbital performance, with 
a p reassigned, numerical assessment of reliability*
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II. J^. JjnbugL P rogram o f Ac t ivi t ie s
The GE responsibilities as a major contractor 
to the NASA/GSFC Systems Manager were:
1* Conduct detailed electrical and mech­ 
anical design studies.
2. Design, build, test, and evaluate the
stabilization and attitude control system to ' 
broadly defined goals/specifications.
3. Design, build, test, and evaluate the
passive and active thermal control system,
4. Design,, build, test, and evaluate the 
antenna systems, based upon a feasibility study 
provided by the University of New Mexico,
5* Design, build, test, and evaluate the 
spacecraft structure to the general outline and 
systems design provided by NASA/GSFC,
6. Design, test, and evaluate all models* 
Including: full-scale mock-up (pre-prototype) ; 
prototype ; flight; structural dynamics; antenna; 
thermal; separation.
7* Integrate all equipments/components
into the several models spacecraft (engineerings, 
prototype/qualification, flight)* conduct inte­ 
grated systems level tests and evaluate the per­ 
formance under a wide range of environmental 
conditions.
8. Provide the adapter structure to the 
launch vehicle.
9. Design and fabricate all special test 
and ground handling-equipment for the spacecraft*
10'* Integrate the ground stations required • 
to coronand» teat, evaluate the spacecraft at 
the plant in Alaska•
lit Design and provide computer programs 
for engineering evaluation at the plant and for 
operational evaluation during flight*
11* Provide operational systems engineer­ 
ing to evaluate in*flight performance 
lift*off to completion of in»orbit system checks*
II* Provide launch support services*
14* Bstablish, staff» and operate the 
Technical Control Center it M,SA,/iSFG in
suppo11 § f orbi ta1 oper*tions.
For a number of reasons* teat and evaluation 
(concept if "test/fix11) occupies mm essential 
portion of the activity;
I* Minibus Is a complex spacecraft* having 
i, cwpltx control system and i, variety of individ* 
'lit! senior loads»
1* Many co*contree tors, each an indepen­ 
dent contractor to NASA/GSFC» provided equipment 
services to tint spacecraft tt *
but iaii no tittrit eontrtetuel 
responsibility to the integration end teet ecu-
3. Mechanical and electrical interfaces 
were very loosely defined for Nimbus I, but some­ 
what more tightly for Nimbus II.
4. Sensor/pay loads and spacecraft design 
represented advanced state-of-art , with their
understanding and appreciation maturing as the 
efforts progressed.
5. A comparatively short development time
existed,, considering the absence of a technical
baseline design from which to grow,
The complexity of the control system, with
its own composition of basic elements provided by 
many internal design, groups and external vendors, 
resulted in problems of program management similar 
to those encountered by the multiplicity of 
CO' -con tractors. Supporting the GE in-house efforts 
was the entire complex of NASA/GSFC, including, 
but not limited to personnel from groups concerned 
with: equipment., and component design; materials; 
test and evaluation; reliability; tracking and. data 
systems ; and most important , the NASA/GSFC Nimbus 
Project group itself* 'The devoted effort of the 
NASA/ Indus try team jointly attacking problems as 
they arose in these, sample areas may be considered 
am essential factor in the resulting long life.
Ill , Ba s ic De s i.gn Cons idera t ions
A. Pes ign Ph i losop fay
Except for the comparatively simple spin 
stabilized spacecraft, which have demonstrated 
extremely long; life records, Nimbus has demonstrated 
the longest life in orbit of the complex spacecraft. 
16 a not inconsiderable extent, this performance nay 
be attributed to the depth to which this spacecraft 
and its related ground systems vere conceived, 
analyzed, planned t and conceptually integrated. 
before extensive detailed design effort occurred. 
In essence, .Nimbus is well "system engineered", 
with the system design obviously being the result 
of thorough consideration having been given to 
mission objectives and test, qualification and 
evaluation requirements »
The basic hardware design was planned to 
provide means for extensive evaluation of the space­ 
craft through its environmental test program, and 
s isolated ., opera t iona lly-controlled , orbital flights 
In both ambient and vacuum/ thermal environments* 
Conservatively high estimates of the environmental 
stresses expected to be encountered by the space­ 
craft were selected, these being embodied In both 
the environmental specifications and designs »
overall system design recognised the 
dearth of quantitative design data and the prepon­ 
derance of qualitative design factors* A priori 
confidence of success fill orbital performance 
provided to the engineering design with a **test» 
evaluate* re-design » re- test** or **test - fiat - test* 
philosophy :s such that iterative application of 
these elements would result In a control system 
in m spacecraft which would have but twill tlfcell* 
hood of failure after launch.
* I, formil redundancy policy did wist, 
nevertheless* fu&etio&fcl end block is
it, 1
provided as failure protection at the system, level 
in several ways. These can be categorized as 
being related to the overall aerospace/ground 
system, the spacecraft and its "housekeeping" 
systems3 and the sensor instrumentation payloads. 
Figure 1 shows the redundancy built into the 
stabilization and attitude control system.
The large number of spacecraft oper­ 
ations which are controllable from the ground by 
command provide a failure protection mode* By 
ground command all but essential subsystems can 
be set to their off or standby modes of operation, 
resulting in a standby mode or minimum spacecraft. 
This capability has proved to be quite important 
during all phases of system testing as well as 
during orbit, when it was important to "sit tight" 
and reflect upon performance preparatory to 
issuing commands. The ground command capability, 
for example, allows selection of different pay- 
loads, modes of operation^ voltage levels for 
motors, and redundant elements in the command 
receiver. It is the key element which allows 
energy to be managed during the orbit, thus insur­ 
ing batteries are not discharged at rates higher 
than or to levels lower than allowed by their 
design. Most pre-programmed on-orbit operations 
can be over-ridden from the ground through real 
time and stored commands.
2. Con f igura t ion ... Mana gement - Forma 1 
configuration management was not an engineering 
design requirement. Following release of engi­ 
neering data, design change control formally 
restricted alterations to designs and drawings. 
A Design Change Control Board met almost daily 
to review and act upon proposed changes required 
to continue activity, normally general improve­ 
ments in designs were not acceptable reasons for 
a change - rather changes were authorized pri­ 
marily because of design errors, manufacturing 
or materials problems.
3. Interface Controls - General Electric 
Company practices were followed for defining 
electrical, mechanical, and thermal Interfaces 
for all components and subsystems provided 
internally. These were controlled, by the docu­ 
mented engineering data multistage release 
system in effect then.
Interface information necessary for 
design of mating components and elements being
developed by'independent internal groups flowed 
readily from one to the other* allowing changes 
to be made informally during the formative design 
period.. .An extensive and most valuable set of 
informational drawings were developed, each set 
devoted to a particular part of design* e*g«; 
a) signal flow; b) command flow; c) grounding 
and d) electric power and distribution* Bach' 
showed interfaces in detail* with brief verbal 
and technical descriptions of the input/output 
•matching stages (voltages, impedances, 
constants, etc.).
4, __
Failure mode and effects analyses were conducted 
on much of the control •system* especially during 
the early phases of design where its impact was 
greatest. This technique was just being developed 
as a design tool in I960 so its application here 
was somewhat of a "first". Later this analysis 
was if plied to some of the integration and test 
effort including the operational programs *
5. jfcdglg_ior_De^t^!i - light model space* 
craft or major sections (pre -prototype s antenna 
And adapter* ' thermal, structural dynamics, separa­ 
tion,. prototype/qualification, electrical systems , 
flight) were fabricated, tested, and evaluated as 
farts of the total design cycle. Each is con­ 
sider® J to have contributed significantly to the 
final design* hence their inferred contribution 
to a long*life design.
6. Flece Parts- - The Nimbus spacecraft 
contains approximately 40300 electronic -type piece 
farts* The engineering and pro to type/qua lifica - 
tion of the control system were built with
coflMercial quality parts (5000) . No testing 
or evaluation of parts was done except for brief 
test ing of functional performance.
The flight model spacecrafts were built 
vith the commercial quality parts. However, 
by the time farts were to be ordered and accumu­ 
lated for producing three flight model spacecraft, 
required power aging (burn -in) of piece 
part a 9 especially transistors and diodes,
Occasional circuit failures caused by 
piece parts occurred* but elements were 
replaced during the almost continuous testing to 
wnich the control system, was exposed. Tine: "make 
and test" philosophy which was central to the 
development of the control system, served effec­ 
tively as paver conditioning and -parts selection 
controls. The degree to which activity 
"cost effective" Is problematical* and was never 
assessed*
B, De s i gn Be a t tires
.1, " Modular layout - 'Hie design 
of the spacecraft provided fieri: 'two 
structural by a struc­ 
ture, the upper unit being stabilization 
attitude controls 9
pay loads. long-life of Is 
essentially that of - teat- 
ing which could he
Itself Is of 
design, of IS
to be in -or •with­ 
out: «o;f cover plates*
by of either m mx: m torn
is a
mi 
t>f
flexibility tut 
ximg*
'^•j* '" 'he 'Spacecraft
Jiiiitsox Ting, with itss titts'talled equip-
tm be mm is
mounted to the sensor ring framework, with "space 
grease" at interfaces, providing good thermal 
conduction, and in a sense leading the heat to 
be dissipated from the spacecraft to those regions 
of the ring having either flat panels coated with 
paint having a specified ratio of absorptivity 
to emmissivity or to panels having Venetian blind 
type louvres. Their slats opened in response to 
the mechanical motion of a bellows filled with 
freon which has a large coefficient of thermal- 
expansion. In the event the primary bellows 
failed, a secondary bellows acted to move the 
slats to a fixed 30-degree open position. Failure 
has never occurred.
A truly benign environment was achieved 
in the sensor ring on both Nimbus I and Nimbus II. 
Whereas the system design called for a temperature 
of 25° + 10 C, the actual temperature range mea­ 
sured during orbit has been close to + 2°C. The 
thermal design for the control system was also 
extremely conservative. Again passive (paint) 
and active (louvres) systems were used. The 
actual temperature range measured during orbit has 
been close to + 5 C.
3 . Electromagnetic Compatibility Control - 
Potential electromagnetic interference among the 
subsystems through conduction and radiation was 
recognized in the very early phases of system 
design. However, specifications for the design 
and performance of subsystems did not include the 
subjects of limiting the levels of electromagnetic 
interfering signals within the subsystems nor pro­ 
tection against incoming interfering signals 
(susceptibility). Only mild requirements were 
included in the power subsystem limiting the gener­ 
ation of sharp pulses which could be placed on the 
regulated bus. As a consequence, many electro­ 
magnetic interference problems were generated 
immediately as subsystems were interconnected and 
during the first series of electrical systems 
integration tests.
The control system was particularly 
susceptible to conducted interference pulses prop­ 
agated on the power bus, generated by switching 
transients. Most of this susceptance was elimi­ 
nated by revisions in grounding and by filtering. 
Camera shutters introduced substantial transients 
until the input circuits to the camera subsystems 
were revised by substituting inductive for capaci- 
tative input circuits. Circuits in the clock and 
telemetry subsystems were also susceptible to 
power line transients, requiring changes to be 
made to them.
In addition to determining and elimi­ 
nating the sources and effects of conducted inter­ 
ference, radiated interference existed. Leads 
and cables had to be re-routed; shielded leads 
replaced unshielded leads; unbalanced a.c. line 
pairs which were twisted were untwisted; balanced 
a.c. line pairs which were not twisted were 
twisted; many cables were wrapped with metal foil, 
some grounded; and fine mesh screening was installed 
around cameras.
An electromagnetic anechoic chamber not 
being available during systems tests, radiated 
interference entered the antennas, energy being 
reflected from the laboratory's floor and walls.
Hoisting the spacecraft and locating it approxi­ 
mately 15 feet from a reflecting surface minimized 
this type of interference.
Had electromagnetic susceptibility 
requirements been placed on the engineering design 
and performance specifications for each subsystem, 
most of the noise sensitive problems encountered 
during the electrical systems test would never 
have occurred nor would the flight data exhibit the 
degrees and kinds of interference which they do.
4. Maintainability - Two features of the 
conceptual design characterize the consideration 
given to maintenance. The first of these has 
already been noted, namely, the modular design of 
the sensor ring, the standardized sizes of enclo­ 
sures and the placement of connectors on hardware 
allowed easy removal and replacement of components 
during the integration test and evaluation activi­ 
ties. The high degree of selective redundancy 
allowed alternative operating modes thus minimiz­ 
ing down-time during tests and what is, of course, 
most important, failure of the mission in orbit.
An important feature of the Nimbus 
design not to be overlooked is the inherent capa­ 
bility which exists for remote "maintenance and 
repair" while the spacecraft is in orbit. The 
capacity of the command system, directed from the 
ground, to accept many alternative directions and 
orders, coupled with the data relayed through the 
telemetry system, provided a total maintenance 
capability which has proven most effective during 
the life of Nimbus II. This concept of in orbit 
maintenance and repair through cooperative ground 
activity should be expanded and applied as part of 
the engineering systems design of new spacecraft.
5. Command - The large number of commands 
capable of ordering functions on the spacecraft 
provided the flexibility necessary for alternative 
selection of operating payloads and orbital manage­ 
ment of energy. The system allowed 128 coded and 
4 unencoded (emergency) commands. Sixteen of the 
coded commands could be stored in a memory, to be 
actuated at specified times during a given orbit. 
These commands could be revised once each orbit. 
This large number allowed equipments to be turned 
on or off individually and to select among the 
redundant alternative modes of operation, as noted 
earlier. It is clear, had this capability not 
been available to the Nimbus II spacecraft, little 
likelihood exists it would have remained as useful a 
spacecraft for the long period it has.
6. Telemetry - Several references already 
have been made to the role of the telemetry system 
and its alternative modes of operation as con­ 
tributing factors to the long life of Nimbus II. 
In spite of the failure of the telemetry system's 
tape recorder several months ago, almost the full 
status of all subsystems can be monitored nearly 
continuously through the real-time telemetry 
transmissions. This mode allows reception of status 
information by only those properly equipped receiv­ 
ing stations in the tracking network. Without them 
real-time data energy management would have been 
impossible and the entire spacecraft would have 
failed at the time the telemetry system's tape 
recorder failed.
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An, essential feature of the Nimbus space­ 
craft is the total dependence on the telemetry 
system for all systems testing, countdown, launch 
and orbital phases. Although provision was avail" 
able for transmitting telemetry data through hard­ 
wire connection to a telemetry interfacing con­ 
nector, except during the earliest periods of 
testing this method was not used. To provide a 
'more realistic situation, all telemetry data were 
transmitted through radiation from the telemetry 
system's quadra loop antenna system, the data being 
picked up by a receiving antenna (s) connected to 
the ground station's telemetry receivers. This 
allowed assessment of the full telemetry system 
under all conditions including the time when the 
spacecraft was undergoing environmental tests in 
the vacuum./ thermal chamber,
IV. gli^
A. Gene ra 1 Phi lo goghy
Any effective test and evaluation program is 
the fulfillment of a logically planned effort, 
the conduct of which is traceable to some under­ 
lying philosophy. The Nimbus test and evaluation 
effort, as actually conducted, is the eventual 
realization of a set of guidelines established by 
NASA/GSFC prior to 1962. . It is understood these 
have not changed materially in the intervening 
years.
Designing and manufacturing a complex space­ 
craft is more of an art than a science, and 
subject to a large number of alterations and 
constraints representative of many unknown, factors 
and inter-relations which become apparent during 
the development period. A complex spacecraft is 
a good example of a system which usually is not 
fully operable upon "rolling off the end of the 
production line" - the whole is not the sum of its 
parts. The performance of a spacecraft, be it an 
engineering, prototype/qualification or flight 
model, must be evaluated empirically. Performance 
of each model must be demonstrated under simulated 
conditions representative of the environmental 
stresses expected. In essence, tests must supple­ 
ment analyses.
This point of view is particularly applicable • 
to a space program which is essentially research 
and development in .nature, and especially so in a
program which, features a spacecraft of unusual 
design and equipment which pushes state-of-art ,
Conventional approaches to establishing reliability 
and confidence levels, based upon measurements made 
on a relatively large population, simply do not
pertain. Evaluating the performance of the com­ 
pleted spacecraft, however, must not be an isolated 
activity; it must be viewed in the context of the 
activities of a total program, i.e., test and eval­ 
uation activities should not be isolated from other 
activities. Accepting this premise leads to con­ 
sidering test and evaluation requirements very early 
in the planning stage of the total program.
A basic philosophy to guide test and evalua­ 
tion. activities, expecially at systems level, can 
be expressed in seven brief statements.
1. Very conservatively define the total 
environment and the stress levels expected to be 
experienced by the subsystem and/or system (the 
spacecraft). Include as environments: manu­ 
facturing, ambient, laboratory, handling, shipping, 
storage, launch, space,
2. Separately qualify each prototype sub­ 
system and sensor/instrument payload before in­ 
stalling it into the spacecraft. Study of avail­ 
able specifications indicate for some subsystems 
loosely defined demonstrations of performance were 
acceptable evidences of qualification. Further, 
individual subsystems were not required, at the 
time of their initial development, to adhere to 
the same single set of evaluative tests to demon­ 
strate qualification of design for space use. 
Some subsystems required engineering development 
beyond their anticipated scheduled completion 
dates, resulting in fully qualified hardware not 
being available for installation into the space­ 
craft at the times planned. The GE-operated bench 
acceptance test activities screened some mal­ 
functioning equipment, but it also allowed other 
marginally-performing equipment to be installed 
into the spacecraft.
3. A prototype/qualification spacecraft, 
complete with identical equipment, and payload 
sensors as will be incorporated into the final 
flight spacecraft, and in full operating condition, 
including electro-explosive devices, as required, 
should be tested in a series of environments simu­ 
lating those anticipated, augmented by appropriate 
safety factors as noted in 1. above. The time 
duration of testing in a vacuum/thermal environ­ 
ment should be two weeks. The conservative assump­ 
tion is made that a spacecraft whose design is to 
be evaluated which could not survive these tests 
is poorly designed and is not suitable for a space 
program. Obviously all components and subsystems, 
even those whose orbital lifetimes are short, must 
survive the test period and not constrain the tests.
4. Separately expose to vibration and 
vacuum/thermal acceptance tests each flight sub­ 
system and sensor/instrument payload before in­ 
stalling it into the flight spacecraft. For the 
most part, equipments destined for flight use were 
exposed to the environments noted and to full accep­ 
tance tests. The problems and failures encountered 
during the integrated systems level tests indicated 
even these tests were not, in many cases, effective 
means for screening potential failures. It is pre­ 
sumed, where opportunity existed, equipment intended 
for Nimbus II was tested to a better degree than 
similar equipment which was incorporated into Nimbus 
I. This trend is continuing for successive Nimbus 
spacecraft.
5. Similarly, each flight spacecraft should 
be tested to a set of environmental stresses which 
define an. acceptance test. Obviously, to conduct 
such program requires the spacecraft: to be amply 
provided with command capability to allow it to be 
thoroughly exercised during the environmental tests; 
to be amply instrumented with telemetry to allow 
rap id asses sment o f perfG nuance of s ub systerns; and 
to communicate between the ground control reception 
point and the spacecraft through only a radio link
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(no hardwire), The Nimbus spacecraft is designed 
to allow testing to be so accomplished.
6. A strong policy should be followed mini­ 
mizing the replacement or removal of any equipment 
from the spacecraft between the start of flight 
acceptance tests and launch. Access to, adjust­ 
ment, or disassembly of the spacecraft or its sub­ 
systems should be discouraged. The system should 
remain intact and last-minute changes avoided. 
Make no hardware changes at the launch site.
7. Prior to start of the actual test and
evaluation program, the participating active
ground equipment, facilities, handling mechanisms, 
detailed test procedures, and test conductors and
supporting personnel should, in a sense, be 
"qualified",
B. Functions of the GE Test and Evaluation Program
The primary functions of the GE Test and Eval­ 
uation Program can be summed as:
Estimate orbital environments
Establish and prepare general, specific, and 
detailed test specifications and procedures
Conduct subsystem tests for equipment pro­ 
vided by GE
Conduct systems test and evaluation using 
antenna, structural, thermal, electrical, 
prototype/qualification, and flight models
Redesign or recommend redesign., as required, 
based on results of the test and evaluation 
program
Provide certified personnel, procedures, and 
facilities for all tests except the accelera­ 
tion test
Subsystems were intended to have been, evalu­ 
ated prior to their integration into the spacecraft 
for system level tests, to the same regime as 
planned for the system,, i.e ( , -engineering 3 proto­ 
type/qualification or flight acceptance test levels 
to their own specific set of specifications,. Detec­ 
tion of marginal performance conditions, early 
wear-out and failures were the primary results to 
be achieved from a strong subsystems test program,
Notwithstanding the detailed overall program 
planning to have available for systems level test­ 
ing fully qualified, ready to use subsystems, 
schedule changes in various parts of the program 
resulted in some co*contractor's equipment being 
delivered to the General Electric Company in a 
not-fully performance-evaluated condition* Each 
piece of co-eontrietor 1 s equipment ©r sensor pay* 
load was to have passed its prototype/qualifica­ 
tion and/or flight acceptance tests before deliv* 
ery for incorporation into the spacecraft, 
undetected failure or out-of"specification con­ 
dition which passed these co-contractors 1 screens 
theoretically would be picked up in the acceptanct 
tests for government-furnished equipment or in flit 
systems level tests *
It was therefore necessary to institute a
vigorous and carefully documented acceptance test 
program for all equipment provided by co-contractors, 
with product assurance controls patterned somewhat 
after those required by the total spacecraft* 
This program only allowed either acceptance or 
rejection of the elements of or a complete sub­ 
system, based on functional performance tests in 
an ambient laboratory environment. Based on accum­ 
ulated experience, it is postulated 'many functional 
performance problems which were encountered during 
the systems test program would never have occurred 
had each of the subsystems been operated under 
appropriate environmental stress conditions for a 
time duration sufficient to establish little further 
likelihood of additional failures.
V, Test and Evaluation Programs 
A. Ba s i c C qns i d e r a. t i on s
To a great extent high emphasis was placed on 
the sp a c ec ra ft' s sy s t em, 1 eve 1 te s t and e va lua t ion 
p ro g ram ( " - - - - -de s i gn. -1 es t - fix -1 es t - fix- - - - - '*')
because it served as an overall screening function, 
to detect and indicate corrective actions which, 
had not previously been indicated in the individual 
subsystems because of the limited testing; to which
they had. been exposed. System, level testing.,, how­ 
ever, should n.ot be considered as an isolated.
activity; its role must: be part of a comprehensive 
test and evaluation program,..
A stru.ctu.ral concept of the test and evalu­ 
ation program, fox Nimbus (and one which is also 
applicable to other programs) is shown in Figure 2, 
Each level of testing is designed to discover weak-
ne s s e s , a noma 1 o u s b e h a v i Q' r a nd. fa i. lur e s win i, c h 
passed through a lower level testing,, and. those
similar characteristics of performance which, may be 
generated by interactions created by the .functional/ 
physical forms associated with that level.
Theoretica1ly, i f a suffieiently comprehensive 
and, effective test and evaluation program bad 'been 
consummated at Level i, failures in testing; at 
Level (i+1) should not be anticipated as cowing 
from Level i, but rather as coming from unantici*- 
pated causes peculiar to' the total environment 
"associated with Level (i+1) . Corrective action. 
could therefore be localized and minimized.
Levels 1 to 4 pertain, to the design, ties t, and, 
evaluation of subsystems. T'hey are designed to 
demonstrate: achievement of design,, goals, perfor­ 
mance, structural and functional integrity, and 
assurance particular pieces of hardware are in fact 
of sufficiently high quality to be incorporated 
into a., flight spacecraft* Presumably, if the flight 
acceptance test program at subsystem level does 
realistica1ly take into account anticipated environ­ 
mental stresses, and if the subsystem has been 
tested for a time period to have eliminated infant 
mortality failures, testing at systems level should 
encounter pxoblems princIpa1ly attributable to 
integrating subsysterns,
Level 5 ;|l , Systems Testing, encompasses a vide 
spectrum of testing activities on the Nimbus pro­ 
gram since it includes evaluation of * large number
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of special-purpose spacecraft models. Final veri­ 
fication of the adequacy of design of the space­ 
craft (as a bus) and its complete integrated pay- 
load was demonstrated by the performance of the 
prototype/qualification spacecraft under extreme 
environmental stresses. Exposing each flight 
spacecraft to a flight acceptance test program 
wherein it must perform while subjected to 
environmental stresses similar to those expected 
during and after launch is the ultimate means for 
instilling confidence it is ready for launch.
Level 6, Flight Readiness Testing, demon­ 
strates no degradation to have occurred during 
transportation from the factory to the launch site, 
no short-term degradation to have developed during 
the conduct of the launch-site activities, con­ 
cluding with the final checking of the spacecraft f s 
critical parameters as part of the launch count­ 
down prior to lift-off.
In spite of differences which may in reality 
have existed between what each level of test 
should have accomplished and what it did in fact 
accomplish, including both depth and time duration 
of testing, the Nimbus 1 and II spacecraft were 
exposed to a more comprehensive and longer series 
of tests than any other spacecraft developed under 
the aegis or at the Goddard Space Flight. Center. 
As noted earlier, although causal relations cannot 
be established, the fact the Nimbus II spacecraft 
has demonstrated exemplary in-orbit performance is 
sufficient for other spacecraft programs to con­ 
sider Nimbus 1 test and evaluation program as a 
model for planning purposes.
B. Test Procedures and Plans
The complex nature of the"Nimbus spacecraft 
and the many alternative modes of operation pos­ 
sible with the housekeeping and sensor/payload 
subsystems preclude leaving to chance its operation 
and control. This is especially so during the 
initial system level integration tests when test 
conductors and supporting personnel are becoming 
acquainted with the expensive spacecraft and 
supporting test facilities. Careful pre-planning 
of all factors of the test and evaluation program 
is essential. Simultaneous with intensive reviews 
of the first drafts of documents within the 
General Electric Company, representatives of 
NASA/GSFC, and to some extent co-contractors, 
reviewed plans. These were comprehensive and in 
step-by-step-detail to insure little likelihood 
of errors of omission and/or commission during 
the test program. The reviews were not infallible; 
corrections in test plans still had to be made 
during the conduct of the tests. Following review 
and approval by NASA/GSFC representatives,,, the 
procedures and test plans were the guiding docu­ 
ments for the actual conduct of systems level 
tests,
Several auxiliary advantages result from the 
preparation of these plans* Their value as educa­ 
tional and training aids is unquestioned* Each
participant having a defined responsibility for 
part of the test program is forced to pre-plan, his 
activities and to consider the impacts and impli­ 
cations of his activities on those of other sub­ 
systems* Close working relations developed
between the test personnel and the 
C0*c0fityact0r0 f ''representative** Existence of 
formal procedural documents forced consideration 
to be given to the exact environments to be 
simulated and to the specification of criteria 
for evaluating performance of the individual sub­ 
systems total spacecraft as an integrated 
0 y s tern *
c*
The Test Program for tbe Mimflw* 11 satellite 
was based upon tbe wealth of experience
•by its predecessor program, Ninbus I* A full flight
spacecraft acceptance test program at flight envi­ 
ronmental levels was conducted as were environmental
qualification tests of new subsystem designs* A 
full spacecraft qualification program was carried 
out for Nimbus 1, but not for Nimbus II,
The complete Nimbus II system test program 
constittjted four stages;
A prototype test program - intended pri­ 
marily to complete the design development and 
system integration,
A sensory ring test program - intended 
to integrate all flight quality subsystems within 
the sensor ring and essentially subject this 
identifiable, major part of the spacecraft to 
flight acceptance testing,
A spacecraft test program - intended to 
integrate all elements of the complete spacecraft 
and subject it to flight acceptance testing.
A launch test program - intended to pre­ 
pare the flight spacecraft for launch,
1. Prototype Test Program Plan - The proto­ 
type/qualification spacecraft from, the Nimbus I 
program was updated to the Nimbus II design con­ 
figuration. It served also as the initial 
.for integrating subsystems, the composite resulting 
in the Electrical Systems Model for limb us II. 
This spacecraft was used for electrical., electro- 
nagnetic compatibility control, mechanical and 
Interference testing. Following its use within 
the test - program, the prototype spacecraft was 
exposed to the launch test program in -house and at 
the Western Test Range.
2. Sensor Ring Test. Program Flan - Follow­ 
ing physical Installation of flight quality hard­ 
ware into the sensor ring, the subsystems were 
energized to form an operating system. Electrical 
te s t Ing e 1 Imlna ted technica 1 d 1 sc repanc ie s , int e r - 
ferences and Incompatibilities not previously 
encountered in the prototype test program. Follow­ 
ing the electrical testing, the sensor ring as a 
major subasserafoly was subjected to an acceptance 
test program designed as a prelude to a similar 
program for the entire spacecraft..,
3» Flight., Spacecraft Test. Program Plan - 
The flight spacecraft was subjected to a compre­ 
hensive acceptance test program, including vibra­ 
tion testing; at levels for the Thrust Augmented 
Thor»Ageaa launch vehicle QfLmbus j wa§ placed in 
orbit by the, Thor-Agena vehicle) tbetaial
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vacuum conditions. Briefly, the attitude control 
subsystem (the upper section of the spacecraft) 
was mated to the sensor ring, and the spacecraft "-s 
electrical and mechanical integrity was established. 
Significant performance characteristics are mea­ 
sured before and after each major environmental 
exposure. Tuneable antennas were adjusted prior 
to shipment to the Western Test Range.
4. Launch Test Program Plan - The launch 
test program included a series of pre-shipment 
tests, tests after receipt at the Satellite 
Assembly Building (SAB/WTR), and tests on the 
launch pad after the spacecraft was mated to the 
launch vehicle. Pre- and post-shipment tests 
were preceded by a low- level (workmanship) vibra­ 
tion test to insure the absence of extraneous or 
loose parts.
D. Aspects of the Qualification and Flight 
Acceptance Test Programs
1. Prototype/Qualification Test Program - 
The concepts developed for evaluating the perfor­ 
mance of the complete Nimbus spacecraft repre­ 
sented a substantial departure from those applied 
to other spacecraft developed in the same time 
period. Even at the start of the Nimbus program 
in 1960 there already had been outlined the basic 
elements of the qualification test program. These 
were specifically defined in a set of test speci­ 
fications which described the five environments 
and the stress levels to which the qualification 
spacecraft was to be exposed as part of the systems 
integration and test program. Four elements per­ 
taining to the specification and the test program 
should be noted:
a) The purpose of the qualification 
test program was to discover basic and/or inherent 
weaknesses in the design of the entire spacecraft 
packaged in a form which represented the flight 
spacecraft.
b) The performance of the entire space­ 
craft was to be evaluated while it was in the 
operating condition expected during that portion 
of its flight history being simulated by the 
environmental exposure.
c) Stress levels for vibration tests 
were to be set at approximately 150% of those 
expected by the flight spacecraft (95% level) 
during launch and placement into orbit. The
extremes of temperature were set by specifying 
an increase of + 10°C of those expected during 
orbit.
d) The order of exposure to the five 
environments were:
Humidity
Vibration 
Acceleration 
Pre-vacuum/Therma1 
Va cuum/ The rma 1
As noted earlier, the systems test pro­ 
grams were concerned with evaluating performance 
of the integrated spacecraft. The subsystems 
which were provided as government-furnished equip­ 
ment 'had completed their own qualification test
programs with the exception of a small number of 
components. Therefore, the design being qualified 
by the integrated systems test program was essen­ 
tially an evaluation of the spacecraft as a 
bus/carrier and of the mechanical and electrical 
interfaces among any subsystem and among the sub­ 
systems and the spacecraft, created by the instal­ 
lation of the subsystems into the spacecraft.
The purpose of the program specifically 
was not to evaluate the design of the subsystems, 
although their performances in the system test pro­ 
gram did result in recommendations for the redesign 
of some of them. The test program neither ascer­ 
tains the true levels of stresses which result from 
the exposure nor are the tests made to establish 
stress levels to failure since only one spacecraft 
is available and it cannot be tested to destruction.
Realistic simulation of performance of 
the spacecraft can only be achieved if the space­ 
craft is in fact energized and operating as it 
would normally operate in the expected environment. 
Thus, during the vibration test there were ener­ 
gized the command receiver, the power system on 
batteries, the telemetry/beacon transmitter, and 
the drive motor on the High Resolution Infra-red 
Radiometer. During the vacuum/thermal tests, all 
subsystems which would normally operate in orbit 
were exercised as part of simulated in-orbit oper­ 
ations. Commands were received and acted upon, 
subsystems were turned on and off, measurements 
were made by sensors activated by appropriate 
stimulators, television cameras recorded projected 
test patterns, sensor and telemetry data were 
stored on tape recorders, and data were trans­ 
mitted through radio in both the real-time and 
stored data modes of information transfer.
Exercising the spacecraft effectively 
implies the existence of two additional necessary 
factors - instructions and personnel. The quali­ 
fication test program was conducted in response 
to sets of essentially step-by-step instructions 
embodied in written detailed test plans which were 
continually reviewed and revised. Personnel oper­ 
ating the spacecraft were being trained to be 
called upon later to operate the flight spacecraft 
in its acceptance test program and in orbit. 
Operational systems planning was completed and 
written in detail. Computer programs were devised 
for use with the telemetry data to allow its 
reformatting, special read-outs, energy balance, 
conversion from binary digital counting to practi­ 
cal engineering units of measure, and other factors 
as desired. These were all essentially completed 
and ready at the start of the simulated flight 
operations tests in the vacuum/thermal test chamber. 
Similar preparations, suitably up-dated,, were made 
as part of the flight acceptance test program..
The simulated flight tests started with
the spacecraft on the launch pad, with appropriate 
equipment in full operating condition as they would 
be in truth. At lift-off, the pressure in the 
vacuum/thermal chamber was reduced,, simulating the 
expected change in pressure/altitude. Subsystems 
were energized (solar paddles were in the unfolded 
position)., monitored, and exercised on a real time 
'basis as they would be in the early and later 
orbits after several days following launch., all 
such activity in accordance with the guidelines
17.1-8
and instructions embodied in the operational 
systems documents. Commands to the spacecraft 
were generated by the Test Director, written 
and forwarded to the ground command equipment, 
and then transmitted via radio to the space­ 
craft's command receiver. Telemetry and sensor 
derived data were transmitted from the space­ 
craft via radio to the ground receiving equip­ 
ment. Antennas were mounted inside the vacuum/ 
thermal chamber to permit this transmission. 
Hardwire communications to and from the space­ 
craft was not permitted. There was no access 
to the normal test points used in the develop­ 
ment or subsystems test programs.
During the several days operation, 
thermal stress cycling was provided with real 
time and/or near real-time evaluation of all 
data transmitted from the spacecraft. All 
decisions regarding the performance of the 
spacecraft and its subsystems were made on the 
basis of data emitted by the spacecraft. It 
was necessary to rapidly interpret data, and 
assess whether the test program should cease 
because of the exhibition of malfunctions, 
anomalous behavior, or failure. These require­ 
ments provided on-the-job training for the test 
conductor, the entire test crew, the personnel 
operating the ground equipment, and all NASA 
personnel who were later to be faced with true 
situations.
When the environmental test speci­ 
fication was written, a comparatively limited 
amount of data were available regarding the 
vibration environment during the launch phase. 
A central problem attendant to an environmental 
test program is the establishment of appropriate 
stress levels. The vibration specification was 
based upon the knowledge available at the time 
for the Atlas/Agena launch vehicle, updated as 
more data became available between the time of 
the initial specification and the time of the 
tests. The stress level for the vibration test 
was set to be a 99% probability level, i.e., 
during flight, there would be only one chance 
in a hundred the flight spacecraft would experi­ 
ence a vibration environment more severe than 
that experienced by the prototype/qualification 
spacecraft in its test program. Assuming a 
Gaussian distribution of the vibration stress 
levels, the 99% level is set at the mean level 
(i.e., the mean vibration level expected based 
upon actual measurements) plus 1.5 times the 
difference between the mean level and the 95% 
level. In essence, the 150% vibration test 
level is based on the 95% level on a Gaussian 
distribution of expected stresses not on the 
150% of the mean value. Thus, all test levels 
are far more severe than the average stress 
level which may be encountered in a flight. 
The duration of the vibration test was selected 
to give assurance the flight units would survive 
the environments imposed both in the acceptance
tests and in the actual launch activity.
»
The temperatures to which the space­ 
craft would be exposed in orbit, the quality 
of the thermal design and the temperature regu­ 
lating system were not known with high confidence. 
Consequently, in establishing the extreme levels
of stress for these tests comfortable margins of 
safety were chosen. While inside the "space 
chamber" for the vacuum/thermal tests, the space­ 
craft was exposed to radiant heating to achieve 
the specified profile. All temperatures were 
measured on the spacecraft ! s most massive non-heat 
producing section, part of the sensor ring. The 
structure had mounted thereon a number of tempera­ 
ture detectors. The lowest temperatures read on 
the structure was taken to be the level specified 
as the high temperature, and the highest tempera­ 
ture on the structure was taken as the level 
specified as the lowest temperature. Temperature 
readings were made when the pressure was less than 
or equal to 10" mm Hg; the rate of pressure 
change was to be no greater than the pressure/time 
profile expected in flight. The spacecraft was 
interrogated bi-hourly, looking for any changes or 
anomalous performance which would be interpreted 
as a forerunner of an equipment failure or harmful, 
but slow degradation or out-of-specification con­ 
dition.
As data have been accumulated over the 
past several years, and the skills of spacecraft 
designers have improved, the needs for these 
extremes have diminished and tighter tolerances 
will no doubt be specified.
While the qualification test program 
pertained specifically to the Nimbus I program, a 
partial qualification test program was in effect 
for Nimbus II. The sensor ring with its subsystems/ 
experiments were exposed to a qualification test 
program, including exposures to humidity, gas leak, 
vibration, acceleration, and vacuum/ thermal.
Two additional factors were necessary 
before initiating the qualification test program:
1) Criteria and/or guidelines to judge 
whether the spacecraft and its full complement of 
installed equipment "passed" the qualification test.
2) An operating plan to define what
should be done in the event of failure of an element 
during the test program.
Formal and rigid acceptance criteria 
were not established during the qualification test 
program. Presumably, the absence of formal tech­ 
nical criteria provided the NASA Project and Space­ 
craft Managers with more freedom to exercise tech­ 
nical judgments related to program flight schedule, 
and expenditure commitments. Collective technical 
judgment is a most important factor and quite cor­ 
rectly should take precedence over detailed formal 
planning, which should be subject to amendment as 
the test program proceeds. In a sense, this was 
acceptable since in many cases quantitative descrip­ 
tions of performance would not have had firm bases 
for their specification. For example, although the 
resolution of the television camera system had been 
quoted at 800 lines (in one diameter inch tube), 
this actually pertained only to the central section 
of the tube. If 700 lines resolution were found in 
a tube, this would hardly be cause for rejecting 
the spacecraft. As the test program developed, 
specific criteria were formulated for some sub­ 
systems. The NASA Project Manager relied heavily 
on the judgment of the members of the Nimbus
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Environmental Test Committee, whose membership 
included NASA/GSFC and GE representatives. This 
group monitored, reviewed, and recommended changes
in the rationale for testing and evaluating test 
data, and it reviewed all test data and made 
recommendations to the NASA Project Manager as to 
whether the spacecraft and its installed equipment 
met design objectives and was qualified.
The rejection retest plan was formu­ 
lated before the start, of the program. Its essen- 
tia 1 features were:
a) If the spacecraft is rejected before, 
during, or after an exposure, discontinue the 
exposure .
b) Determine the cause of failure, and 
co rrec t i t a, inc lud ing any d e s i gn defects.
c) Starting at the event, timing, tem­ 
perature where the failure occurred, repeat the 
complete test program until successful.
2. Flight Acceptance Test Program - Little 
differentiated the flight acceptance program for 
the Nimbus I and II spacecraft. Basically, the 
same set of environmental specifications pertained. 
Whereas the qualification test program searched 
for inherent design weaknesses, the flight accep- 
program could be characterized by the following:
a) 'The purpose of this test program was 
to determine the flight, worthiness of the flight 
spacecraft and to discover workmanship defects 
and/or errors in use of materials.
b) The performance of the entire space­ 
craft, which, was to be an exact replica of the 
p ro t o^ t yp e / qua 1 i, f i ca t i on. spa cec r a f t., wa s to b e 
evaluated, in the' operating, condition expected 
during, that portion of its flight history being 
simulated by the environmental exposure.
c) Stress levels were to be set at 
approximately 100% of those expected by the flight
spacecraft during launch and orbit...
d) 'The order of exposure to the three 
environments were:
Vibration
Pre - va cuum/Therma 1 
Va cuum/Therma 1
Since flight acceptance testing; follows 
the qualification acceptance test of a single 
spacecraft, no prior knowledge has been developed 
regarding, the expected variations among supposedly 
identical spacecraft.. The assumption is made no 
variation exists, which, of course,, is statisti­ 
cally invalid, but economically wholesome* On. 
the presumption that all design, defects have been 
eliminated as a, result of the qualification test 
program, the flight acceptance test program is 
presumed to screen only for workmanship and /or 
material errors and defects* That this is not so 
Is ably demonstrated by analysis of the failures
ing the flight acceptance test pro-
I, Nimbus II, and many other 
________for which comparable data, 
hav
The stress levels used in the flight 
acceptance tests were the best estimates of these 
anticipated in the launch/flight environment. The 
test levels were to be no greater than those 
expected in these environments. In the case of 
the vibration tests, the stress level was set by 
first assuming a Gaussian distribution of vibration 
levels (based on accumulated experience). The test 
level was the 957o probability level, i.e., one 
chance in twenty this level would be exceeded dur­ 
ing the actual launch. The 95% level is the 1.650* 
point.
An innovation introduced into the vibra­ 
tion test program for Nimbus II was the use of 
notching techniques. The combination of the space­ 
craft and the drive power/frequency characteristics 
of the vibration table were such that if the orig­ 
inal amplitude/frequency specification were adhered 
to, the spacecraft structure could be overs tressed. 
Analysis and vibration survey data indicated fre­ 
quency bands wherein the drive power of the vibra­ 
tion table should be reduced with no resulting 
deleterious effect on the purposiveness of the 
vibration test program. These specific notch 
points were then incorporated as part of the final 
specification for the vibration tests.
The same rejection and test plan was 
stipulated for the flight acceptance test program 
as for the qualification test program, and just 
as easily interpreted on the basis of program 
needs as in the earlier tests.
In addition to the systems test program 
for the entire Nimbus II spacecraft, the sensor 
ring with all equipment installed was exposed to 
a flight acceptance test program in all environ­ 
ments, and with its own vacuum/thermal test cycle.
The rejection and retest plan was not 
followed, in spite of its good intentions. Pro­ 
gram management considerations, trading off per­ 
formance, cost, and schedule factors resulted in 
continued testing in accordance with the planned 
profile, following repairs or replacement of failed 
equipments, rather than recycling the tests.
3. Launch Pad Test Program - The test pro­ 
gram at the Western Test Range was conducted to 
ascertain that the flight spacecraft had not 
suffered any detrimental damage in being shipped 
from GE/VFSTC to WTR.
VI. Analys is of Failure Records 
- System Tests and Flight
A. The Raw Data
Quantitative analyses were made to determine 
causes of anomalous behavior, out of specification 
performance, and/or failures of components and 
subsystems which form the total spacecraft, encoun­ 
tered during the flight acceptance tests for Nimbus 
I and II and their performances in orbit. All 
available reports within the General Electric 
Company pertaining to these system tests were 
individually examined, including: System Failure 
Reports; Malfunction Reports; Final Test Reports; 
and Flight Reports* These data were supplemented 
by records of in orbit malfunctions as reported 
in GE-originated reports. Failure data pertaining
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to the Prototype/Qualification Test Program were
not reviewed at this time,
B. Method of Data Analysis
The principle method of analysis of the raw 
data is categorization into factors of interest, 
showing for each classification the absolute 
numbers of occurrences. The general classifica­ 
tions are by:
1. Importance of the failure to the sue- . 
cessful operation of the mission or of the sub­ 
system.
2. Attributed cause of failure.
3. Environment and test activity existing 
at the time of failure.
4. Level of testing, other than system 
level, at which the failure could have been 
detected.
5. Subsystem.
6. Type and complexity of subsystem.
7. Source of hardware. 
C. Significant Failures Encountered
The most significant failures encountered 
during the Nimbus I Prototype/Qualification, Nimbus 
I Flight and Nimbus II Flight Systems Acceptance 
Test Programs are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
VII. Lessons Learned and Applied
The experiences encountered during the develop­ 
ment of the Nimbus I and II spacecraft may have 
application to other space programs.
A. Design Practices
Provide extensive alternative modes of func­ 
tional redundancy as a means of failure protection, 
thus enhancing long life potential.
Provide an extensive command system with 
ground command override for programmed functions 
to effectively use alternative modes of operation.
Fabricate all cables and wire groupings on a 
full-scale, exact replica three dimensional mock-up 
model spacecraft. This minimizes stresses and
strains in wiring and connectors,
Give most attention in design and test to non­ 
electronic and complex equipments, since most fail­ 
ures and anomalies occur here*
Be wary of all specifications for components 
and subsystems which contain idealized, "text book" 
conditions for design* test and performance; e,g«,
a transmitter designed for a 50 ohm resistive load 
which actually is to be connected to a transmission
line, impedance matcher and antenna,
- Evaluate all equipment under conditions
of the total expected environment.
Design a thermally benign environment for all 
equipment, to the greatest extent possible,
- Provide a structure and heat control­ 
ling system having high thermal inertia,.
- Provide a thermally conservative design 
whereby the heat dissipating capability is much 
greater than the heat producing sources,
- Provide for thermal load sharing in 
the event of failure or removal of planned equip­ 
ment.
Long life in orbit may be greatly enhanced by:
- Condition/power-age piece parts before
installation, into components.
- Specify conservative stress conditions 
and environments for systems level tests.
- Apply experienced engineers to design,
test and evaluate subsystems and the spacecraft.
- Incorporate functional redundancy
an appropriate command system to allow ground
control.
- Provide a benign thermal environment 
to minimiz e in -orb i t the rma 1 st re s se s,
B - Test"Operations
Qualification tests were not made to destruc­ 
tion levels y hence mo real measure exists of the 
degree of conservative design in the spacecraft. 
There is no way to evaluate the applicability of 
all tests to which the spacecraft and/or subsystems 
were exposed.
Operate each subsystem under normal conditions 
(life-test) after passing its flight acceptance test 
to discover latent failures. This would reduce 
failures and anomalies encountered during the more 
expensive integrated systems test program.
Expose the spacecraft to an orderly planned 
series of tests, each successively encompassing a 
larger number of subsystems which require integrated 
performance.»
Flan the test and evaluation activities early
in the program, preferably concurrently with engi­ 
neering design* Potential problems in the conduct 
of system tests and simulated orbital operations - 
will be exposed early,
The 'best efforts expended in: conservative 
design, engineering, management and test practices.;,, 
selection, and training of personnel are still not 
sufficient to absolutely screen, and eliminate all 
latent failures from, individual subsystems or 
the complete spacecraft* A strong test and evalu­ 
ation program helps to isolate these types o£ 
failures prior to launch; e.g»>
- The control system on I, after 
more than 750 hours of operation, including 
weeks of vacuum/thermal testing.
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- The (2N768) transistor in the command 
clock failed after more than 1000 hours of oper­ 
ation, in spite of conservative circuit design and 
power conditioning of piece parts.
C. Failure Records and Analyses
Report and record all failures and anomalous, 
out-of-specification performance of components 9 
subsystems and the spacecraft system as soon as 
observed.
- Provide expeditious diagnosis and 
determination of the specific reason for the fail­ 
ure.
- Provide closed-loop record of the 
action taken.
- Analyze and record failures and final 
actions taken on a near real time basis. Failure 
records are intended to be used for management 
control, not for purposes of historical record.
D. Documentation
Write all plans, specifications, requirements 
and procedures necessary for a test and evaluation 
program in detail, step by step, before the start 
of the functional activity,
Focus attention on specific problems as they 
arise through rigorous use of the detailed test
requirements and plans documents.
- Confidence is provided to the Test 
Conductor and to the Program Manager by isolating
activities and problems.
E. Personnel
Define fully all responsibilities and author­ 
ities vested in personnel directly handling, work­ 
ing on or operating the spacecraft.
- Do not permit random assumptions to
replace such assignment,
- Avoid misunderstandings which can
lead to strained inter-personal relations and con­ 
sequent loss of operating efficiency.
Certify spacecraft Test Conductors as to their 
ability to operate the spacecraft, to supervise 
the test program, and to take effective measures 
should an emergency arise.
- Provide a unique certificate.
Encourage and train all personnel, through 
direct, conscious management effort, to be per­ 
formance oriented, technically honest, and to 
demonstrate integrity,
- Personnel should feel free to expose 
errors and faux pas without fear of management 
discipline either to themselves or to others.
Establish a highly disciplined environment 
for the test and evaluation program wherein each 
participant knows his job and the personal impact 
he has on the total task.
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Provide long term personnel assignments con­ 
sistent with separable phases/elements of the 
engineering, test and evaluation program and the 
professional interests of the personnel.
- Better use is made of accumulated 
experience than if frequent training and retrain­ 
ing is required.
- Methods are developed for the expe­ 
ditious conduct of routine tasks.
- Develops healthy inter-personal 
relations among members of the project team.
Rehearse all new test activities and phases 
of the test program using the previously published 
detailed test plan containing step-by-step instruc­ 
tions .
F. Technical Reviews
Prepare information flow schematics early in 
the program.
- Show individual schematics for: signal, 
grounding, power, command, telemetry.
- Very useful in system trouble shooting 
and planning operational activities.
Require design reviews for all hardware developed.
- The periodic reviews cover activities 
from the initial concept through qualification test­ 
ing.
- Personnel responsible for hardware 
must be made to understand the review is an essen­ 
tial part of the design cycle, intended to help 
them strengthen the design, and is not a "police" 
action.
- Technically strong, competent, per­ 
ceptive personnel should lead design review activ­ 
ities and recommend action.
- All action items resulting from a 
review are accountable to be accomplished as part 
of the design effort.
Permanently staff the program with Senior 
Consulting Engineers. Their need and contributing 
value were well recognized by the Program Manage­ 
ment .
- The Nimbus program had two,, one in 
the area of mechanical engineering, another in the 
area of electrical/electronic engineering and 
sys terns,
- Each had full responsibility and author­ 
ity for overview of the overall technical perfor­ 
mance of the electrical and mechanical systems and 
to enter into any technical area for analysis/review 
and to recommend changes to all levels of partici­ 
pating personnel and management,
The GSFC 'Nimbus Environmental Test Committee
provided independent guidance directly to the 
NASA/GSFC Project Manager regarding: Test Program; 
Test Levels; Acceptance of Test Results; le-fest 
Requirements,
- GE had two members on this committee, 
the two Consulting Engineers, responsible for the 
areas of "Electronic Systems" and "Design and 
Reliability".
A Launch Readiness Review preceded certifica­ 
tion of flight readiness of the spacecraft.
TABLE I
MAJOR FAILURES DISCOVERED DURING
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM -
NIMBUS I PROTOTYPE SPACECRAFT
Subject
HRIR 
Loss of synchronizing 
signal
AVCS TAPE RECORDER 
Shaft of recorder broke 
in vibration test
COMMAND CLOCK 
One transistor (2N768)
exhibited excessive 
leakage current after 
more than 1000 hours 
operation
ATTITU DE C ON TRO L 
Solenoid valves overheated
Potential
Effect 
on 
Mission
Catastrophic to 
the HRIR subsystem
Catastrophic to stored 
AVCS data
Catastrophic to total 
mission
Po t en t i a 1 ly ca ta s t rop h i c 
to total mission
Action Taken
Mechanical redes igp of 
the mount for the mag­ 
netic pulse pickup which 
moved when vibrated
Component redesigned
Bo'Ught-off,
Replaced the piece 
part with another of 
the same type.
Replaced overheated 
solenoids with others 
of the same type
Attributed Cau.se 
of Failure
Functional design
Functional design
Parts/material
Test procedure
System Test 
Related?
No
No
No
No j
Remarks
Failed as a result 
of extreme tests; 
failure occurred 
during a second 
vibration test at the 
prototype/qualifica­ 
tion test levels.
Circuit was very 
conservatively de­ 
signed with respect 
to expected variations 
in the transistor's 
parameters. This 
explains the long 
time period of operating 
without failure.
Solenoids had not 
failed in performance;
• insulation appeared 
damaged; replaced to 
enhance confidence.
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TABLE 2
MAJOR FAILURES DISCOVERED DURING 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM 
NIMBUS I FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Subject
CORONA
ATTITUDE CONTROL AUXILIARY 
The potentiometer signal to the 
automatic day/night switch 
in the television cameras was 
noisey
AVCS AND MRIR TAPE RECORDERS 
Leaks in the pressurized 
containers
A VC S S- BAN D T MI TT ER 
Marginal automatic 
turn-off signal
ELECTROMAGNETIC 
CONTROL 
Conducted interference through 
transient pulses on power system 
caused by switching some 
equipment
Radiated interference from 
sub- system to subsystem
APT 
Mierophonics on camera tube
TKLOIF.TUY TAPE RECORDER 
HH1K TAPE RECORDER 
Lubrication failures following 
vacuum 'thermal tests.
AT TITrDE CONTROL 
Short circuit of regulated bus 
power because of failure in 
irsulation
TELEMETRY 
Distortion of PCM signal 
at output of the transmitter
Potential 
Effect on 
Mission
Catastrophic to 
the television camera 
systems. 
Degraded and reduced 
performance of the 
telemetry system
The camera systems 
could be made in­ 
operative by improperly 
turning on and off their 
power supplies. 
Mission operations 
would have been 
hampered.
Long term degradation 
of performance
to the 
total through 
of
of ieniori/paylofid and 
orbital
in on m 
difficult
Degraded 
of sensors/payload
Degraded performance
Degraded performance 
leading to catastrophic 
failure of stored 
telemetry and URIR data
Catastrophic to total 
mission
Degraded performance 
of the telemetry system
Action Taken
Redesigned television 
cameras and electric 
power distribution 
systems to remove 
the sources of corona
Bought-off, 
Over-ride command 
capability controls 
power to the cameras
Leaks repaired but 
containers were not 
redesigned
the switching 
gystem, 
an 
to turn-off
of subsystems; 
of filters in 
redesign and 
•Melding of electric power 
distribution 
system
Minimized by shielding 
cables
Redesign; mounting washers 
(Viton) installed to isolate 
camera tube component
Recorders were replaced 
with identical units having 
fresher lubricant
Replaced wiring
Redesign of transmitter to 
allow wide variation of load 
impedance at the trans­ 
mitter output. 
Redesign of the phasing 
transmission line to provide 
more uniform parameters.
Attributed Cause 
of Failure
Functional design
Functional design
Functional and other 
design
Functional design
Functional design 
Functional design
Other design
Parts/ material
Other design and 
fabrication
Functional
System Test 
Related?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Remarks
The redesign 
of 
not to the 
which would 
to In a 
corona- inducing 
environ merit,
Ti m e/ < *n m 
failure
Thermal stress 
11 ow of 
insulation
TABLE 3
MAJOR FAILURES DISCOVERED DURING 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TEST PROGRAM - 
NIMBUS II FLIGHT SPACECRAFT
Subject
ELECTROMAGNETIC 
COMPATIBILITY CONTROL
Conducted interference from 
sub-system to sub-system; 
BRffi/APT/MRIR
interference affecting 
clock
m.
\
ot
m by
I
of flic 
at
ATTITUDE CONTROL
IXJ&K oi the ' f /V f scanner 
video .signal
MHIII
Radiometer motor stopped
Potential Effect 
on Mission
Degraded performance 
of sensors/payload
Degraded performance 
of clock
Long term degradation 
of performance
Degraded performance
Lessened margin of
gaiety lor receiving 
commands
Degraded performance
of Camera No, 2
• None since telemetry 
System does not operate 
at +35°C; degraded per­ 
formance would result. 
if the spacecraft would 
operate at this elevated 
temperature
Catastrophic to the total
mission
Catastrophic to the per­ 
formance of the MRtR 
sub-system
Action Taken
Redesign of HRffi (internal 
shielding) and improved 
shielding of electrical power 
and signal distribution 
system
Redesigned circuits 
in clock
Leaks repaired but con­ 
tainer was not redesigned
Replaced relay with no 
other change
Bought Off. 
Problem disappeared 
after exposure to 
vacuum; presumably 
component dried.
Replaced the vidicon 
camera tube
Bough t-off.
Replaced Infra reil Scanner 
Amplifier (IHSA) and Amp­ 
lifier. The specific c nil so 
of failure was not found; 
the problem \\;is not 
duplieateil
Motor was re-lubricated 
No design change although 
it is known motor is of 
marginal design for its 
application
Attributed Cause 
of Failure
Functional design
Functional design
Functional and other 
design
Parts /mate rial
Parts/material
Parts/material
Parts/materials
Other <l,-M»n. 
Kabrk-utioii 
Partis/Material
Functional design
System Test 
Related?
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No,
N<>
No
Remarks
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Figure 1. Functional and Block Redundancy-Spacecraft Subsystems
